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Gatekeeping is the term used to describe the role of primary
care physicians or general practitioners (GPs) in authorising
access to specialty care, hospital care, and diagnostic tests.1
Gatekeeping has crucial influences on service utilisation, health
outcomes, healthcare costs, and patient satisfaction.
In the UK access to NHS and private specialists is generally
possible only after a referral from a GP. Gatekeeping was
developed as a response to a shortage of specialists and a desire
to control healthcare spending2 and has been an accepted practice
in the UK for over 100 years.3 The NHS is under considerable
pressure to use its resources efficiently, and primary care has
helped the NHS to achieve this goal through its gatekeeping
function.4Yet direct access could help reduce GPworkload and
facilitate greater patient choice. We look at the pros and cons
of gatekeeping, describe gatekeeping policies in various
countries, and highlight the need for more evidence to devise
policy.
Controversy around gatekeeping
While GPs in the UK are the gatekeepers to most medical
services, their role in controlling referrals to specialists is the
most controversial aspect of gatekeeping,2 and there is an
ongoing debate about the clinical, economic, and ethical
implications of gatekeeping.1-6 There are valid arguments for
and against gatekeeping (table 1⇓).
Ideally, gatekeeping ensures that patients see specialists only
for conditions that could not be managed by a GP and are
referred to an appropriate specialist, hence saving specialists’
time for more complex cases. However, the claim that
gatekeeping is an effective cost containment method may be
wrong.24 25 For example, we found no significant differences in
the percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) spent on
healthcare (χ2=2.61, P=0.1) in countries with and without
gatekeeping (table 2⇓).
Gatekeeping is associated with delayed diagnosis and adverse
outcomes.14-17 In England, 5000-10 000 deaths within five years
of cancer diagnosis could be avoided every year if earlier
diagnosis and appropriate surgery were provided.15 European
countries with strong gatekeeping have consistently shown a
lower rate of survival for cancer,14 although the effect on
diagnosis is inconsistent.26 The few studies suggest health
outcomes and patient quality of life in gatekeepingmodels might
be similar to those in direct access models.10 11
Finance and ethics
The gatekeeping function of GPs reflects their conflicting roles
as the patient advocate, the system advocate, and, often, part of
a commercial business.27 Financial factors such as competition
and incentives might interfere with their duty to act in the
patient’s best interest and draw GPs to refer patients to
specialists less than or more than needed. A recent example is
the widespread media coverage of ethically questionable
incentive payments to GPs to reduce their specialist referral
rates—including for suspected cancer.28 Patients of GPs who
hold budgets for prescribing and elective secondary care were
less satisfied with the GP’s willingness to refer to a specialist
and were concerned that their doctor was more concerned with
keeping costs down.23
One study found that capitation induces the most referrals to
expensive specialty care, yet fundholding (when practices are
given a fixed budget from which they pay for primary care,
drugs, and non-urgent hospital care) can result in almost as
many referrals as capitation when the costs of GP care are high
relative to those of specialty care.29 American specialists’
attitudes towards the primary care gatekeeping role were
primarily influenced by potential loss of referrals and income;
salaried physicians or those paid by capitation, and those
working in larger and more organised practices, were more
positive.30 In countries with a fee-for-service model, physicians
earn more by treating patients themselves so refer patients to
specialists less often,31 but compulsory gatekeeping might result
in excessive quality competition and too much specialisation,32
drawing GPs to refer patients to specialty care more than needed.
Patient choice and satisfaction
Evidence on the effect of gatekeeping on quality of care and
patient or provider satisfaction is inconsistent and limited.10 11
Policies that limit direct access to specialists, and especially
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those that deny patients’ requests for referral (eg, for a second
opinion), are associated with significantly lower patient
satisfaction,33-35 although not universally.36 Such dissatisfaction
is generally associated with worse outcomes and worse
adherence to treatment.37Gatekeeping negates the person centred
model, patient choice, and shared decision making, which many
governments wish to promote, by placing the decision to refer
with the GP. But others have claimed that gatekeeping may
reduce waiting times to see specialists, hence potentially
increasing patient satisfaction.
Inequalities
Increasing provider choice and giving direct access to specialists
might intensify inequalities in both the use and quality of care.18
Indeed, use of private specialist care is higher in countries where
GPs have a gatekeeper role.19 In the UK, out-of-pocket
expenditure on health as a percentage of private expenditure on
health in the UK is significantly greater than in the US (67.6%
v 26.4%), making access to private specialists a privilege of the
wealthier.20About 11% of the UK population has privatemedical
insurance, but it is unclear how many insurance schemes cover
consultation with private consultants that enable patients to
bypass the NHS system.38 In France, incentives that promote
gatekeeping worsen access to specialists, particularly for poor
and uninsured people covered by complementary insurance.39
However, evidence from European countries shows that
gatekeeping helps reduce healthcare inequalities,18-22 provides
decision making support to disadvantaged groups, and lessens
unnecessary specialist use by advantaged groups,40 who tend to
use specialty medicine more often.18 22
GP-specialist divide
Although some people claim that gatekeeping increases the flow
of information between GPs and specialists,33 it might also
preserve the traditional divide and hinder integrated care. Ideally,
integrated care is achieved when GPs and specialists discuss
the patient’s case directly.
International perspective
The level of gatekeeping is a health system decision and varies
widely between countries. It ranges from free access to
specialists, a need to obtain a referral from a GP to access a
specialist (such as in Australia41), or an option to skip the GP
by paying privately for a specialist19-42 (table 2⇓). In the US,
gatekeeping in access to specialists has been common for many
years,43 and the Affordable Care Act introduced in 2010 did not
change any gatekeeping policies.44 Yet the American health
insurance market is complex, comprising many health
maintenance organisations and private health insurance
companies with different policies. Overall, American physicians
had negative perceptions about the effect of managed care on
access to specialists and were more satisfied with their ability
to refer their fee-for-service patients than the more restricted
options available for patients covered by health maintenance
organisations.45
In France, the 2005 health financing reform law introduced a
voluntary gatekeeping scheme termed “the preferred doctor,”
aiming at regulating access to outpatient specialist care and
providing patients with financial incentives to see their preferred
GP first rather than consult a specialist directly.39-47 Although
the scheme has shown disappointing short terms results,39 it may
have contributed to the reduction in the health system deficit.47
Constraints on access to specialists were offset by rises in their
fees.39 In the Netherlands, a recent study showed that, although
GPs think that patients receive too much care, they practise a
“demand-satisfying” attitude and therefore suboptimally fulfil
the gatekeeper role.48
How much gatekeeping do we need?
How can we facilitate patient choice and yet run a sustainable
NHS? Dowewant a health system cluttered by somany barriers
and delays that it feels unhelpful to its users? Nigel Hawkes
imagined the NHS as a medieval castle, well designed to defend
against “unwelcome intruders.”49 And yet, can the NHS (like
other public and private systems), in an era of financial austerity,
afford to open the “gates”? Can it afford not to, considering the
potential costs from delayed diagnoses or suboptimal treatment?
Finding the right balance is not easy. A good gatekeeping policy
is one that balances clinical needs, patient choice, and system
constraints. The NHS is at one extreme in terms of gatekeeping
in health systems. Policy makers may worry that relaxing
gatekeeping will result in a flood of patients knocking on
specialists’ doors. Yet this might be more of a worry than a
reality: in a capitated, large multispecialty American group
practice, the average number of visits to GPs decreased after
elimination of a gatekeeping system but the average number of
visits to specialists did not change,50 51 although visits to
specialists by children with chronic conditions increased.50
Relinquishing the gatekeeper role for specific patient groups,
such as children and people with eye disorders or
musculoskeletal problems, may alleviate some of the burden
GPs face. In certain cases, it could be cheaper to allow easier
access to specialists or other healthcare professionals, as well
as providing clinical benefits. For example, self referral for
people with musculoskeletal problems has been shown to cut
waiting times and costs, increase patient satisfaction, and reduce
long term pain and disability.52-56 Some clinical commissioning
groups already offer direct access to some specialist services
(box), but there is considerable variation across England.
Plea for evidence
Lack of data makes it hard to decide on how best to implement
gatekeeping. International evidence on the effects of GP
gatekeeping is inconsistent or limited by the low internal
validity. It is also mostly from the US10-40 and hence has limited
applicability to other health systems, particularly those in Europe
which generally have stronger social protection than the US.
In the UK, much of the data on the effect of gatekeeping on
cancer survival were obtained before the two week referral
targets were instituted in the English NHS, and we need
comparable studies conducted after these pathways were
introduced. There are estimations of GP referral behaviour under
common payment schemes (capitation and fee for service),29
but not of the effect of full or selective relaxation of gatekeeping.
In England, for example, there has been little evaluation of the
direct access schemes offered by some clinical commissioning
groups, other than for physiotherapy.57 58
To devise policy, we need evidence on health outcomes, clinical
effectiveness, cost effectiveness, health related quality of life,
quality of care, use of care, NHS workload, and views of
patients, clinicians, and policy makers. Careful evaluation of
pilots implementing gradual relaxation of gatekeeping for
specific specialist areas in UK primary care is needed. Different
forms of gatekeeping, such as incentives and copayment, should
be evaluated. We need to know whether easier access to
specialists inevitably means greater health expenditure.We also
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Clinical areas for which some clinical commissioning groups allow direct access
• Paediatrics
• Physiotherapy
• Smoking cessation
• Mental health services
• Antenatal clinics
• Eye disorders
• Termination of pregnancy
need to know the consequences (intended and unintended) of
strong gatekeeping. Would the secondary care sector be happy
to see less selected and more self referred patients? Does it have
the capacity to deal with them? What would be the resultant
change in case-mix? What are the system implications of
gatekeeping, such as increased use of direct access services?
Which patient groups will benefit the most?
Gatekeeping should be a complementarymechanism in a system
that implements integrated care, with a softer division between
primary and secondary care that enables those who need
specialist care to access it quickly. Rather than focusing on the
“gate”—who controls it and to what extent—we should switch
to focus onmore collaborative work betweenGPs and specialists
with patients, as the most important stakeholder, taking
ownership of their health. An integrated work environment
between GPs and specialists may generate a common sense of
purpose.30
Gatekeeping policies should be revisited to accommodate the
government’s aim to modernise the NHS in terms of giving
patients more choice and facilitate more collaborative work
between GPs and specialists. At the same time, any relaxation
of gatekeeping should be carefully evaluated to ensure the
clinical and non-clinical benefits outweigh the costs.
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Tables
Table 1| Arguments for and against gatekeeping
AgainstFor
Increases costs due to delayed diagnosis. Money saved on access to specialists is
spent elsewhere in the system (eg, increased use of emergency departments)12
Leads to lower use of health services and lower expenditures7-11
Hinders patients from seeing a specialist when they sense their case is not resolved
by the GP
Reduces waiting times to specialists
Negates the ethos of patient choice, empowerment, and shared decision makingSystem cannot sustain everything patients want and needs to have referral
mechanisms
GPs treat only simple and general cases, which hinders clinical knowledgeEnsures that specialists see more complex cases, hence building expertise
May impair clinical outcomes because of delayed diagnosis14-17Increases patient safety and protects patients from adverse effects of
overtreatment1 13
Increases inequalities18-22Reduces inequalities18-20
Preserves the traditional GP-specialist divide, hindering collaborative workingReferral system increases the flow of information and mutual communication
between general practitioners and specialists
Creates conflict in the patient-physician relationship and infringes on patient
satisfaction23
Strong gatekeeping arrangements do not negate satisfaction with services
Increases GPs workloadGPs treat more specialised cases and are exposed to variety of specialised
cases
Financial considerations may create over-referral or under-referral and GPs may
have underlying interests
System efficiency and cost containment
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Table 2| Comparison of gatekeeping policies in various countries
Total expenditure on
health as % of GDP (2013)
Outpatient specialist contactsGP referral required for
specialist?
Country
9.4Fully covered in public hospitals. Copayment when provided outside
hospitals
YesAustralia
11Mostly free with contracted physicians (€10 (£8; $11) annual payment)NoAustria
11.2Copayments of €2.50-€25.50 depending on service type and patient
status
Incentives*Belgium
10.9FreeYesCanada
7.7Vary between health insurances and chosen coverage. Cost sharing
ranges from 10% to 50%
YesChile
7.2Copayment of €1.20 per visitNoCzech Republic
10.6FreeYesDenmark
9.4Copayment of €27.50 per visit to an outpatient specialist in a hospital
up to a maximum of €90.30 per outpatient surgical procedure
YesFinland
11.7Copayment of €1 per visit, plus cost sharing of 30% with a GP referral;
70% otherwise
Incentives*France
11.3Free for patients with statutory health insurance and patients with
selected contracts
NoGermany
8.9Visits at outpatient clinics in public hospitals are free for public patientsYesIreland
7.2Copayment of about ILS25 (£5; €6; $6) once every quarter for unlimited
number of visits to the same specialist
NoIsrael
9.1Copayment of up to €36 for facilities and services included in the
national healthcare entitlements. €10 fixed cost imposed by national
legislation
YesItaly
10.3Coinsurance of 30% of costsNoJapan
12.9No cost sharing once the general deductible is met (€350)YesNetherlands
9.7No cost sharingYesNew Zealand
9.6Copayment of Kr307 (£28; €33; $33), with an annual capYesNorway
6.7FreeYesPoland
9.7Copayment of €7.50 per visit (more than 60% of the population exempt
from copayment)
YesPortugal
9.215% cost sharingYesSlovenia
8.9FreeYesSpain
11.510% cost sharing after general deductible, with an annual capIncentives*Switzerland
9.1FreeYesUnited Kingdom
17.1Varies across coverage schemesVaries across coverage
schemes
United States
*Incentives were defined as financial incentives for the patient (eg, reduced copayment)
Adapted from: http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/organisation-health-care-delivery.htm, http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.75 and http://www.oecd.org/
els/health-systems/Coverage-Cost-sharing-and-exemptions.xlsx
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